

A Sample Hybrid Export Regime  
Designed to Allow Easy Modification  
November 25, 1998  
Draft

### **Default Operational Rules**

Accord - E/I + VAMP extended to 45 days + additional 15 discretionary days + all AFRP.

These default conditions reflect an element of the Accord which is believed to be inefficient at addressing the intended problem and a prescriptive action that is likely to address the most prominent aspect of the intended problem.

The E/I ratio effectively dedicates a volume of water to the reduction of entrainment effects. The way the E/I ratio interacts with the projects results in a volume of water (and, more importantly, a number of fish) that is unavailable for export. This volume of water is greater in years when springtime inflows decline and the percentage of inflow captured for export increases. It may be possible to protect a greater number of fish by re-implementing this standard into a similar volume of water that is used to reduce export impacts in a manner more focused on known distributions and abundances of fish. These default operations assume such an implementation strategy; they do not imply a lack of concern about entrainment effects.

The Vernalis Adaptive Management Plan (VAMP) is a re-implementation of the Vernalis flow requirements in the 1995 SWRCB Plan. A number of entrainment concerns have arisen in recent years about the weeks surrounding the 31 day VAMP period. Extension of the VAMP conditions of exports and flows (to the extent possible) directly addresses these entrainment concerns. The VAMP conditions reflect the same reservoir and hydrological conditions that would need to be addressed with any effort to protect the species of concern in a balanced fashion. Use of the VAMP conditions could permit more experimental releases of salmon and, hence, more data to evaluate the relative effects of flow and export on salmon passage. The extension of VAMP by 15 days reflects a likely need to a greater percentage of the outmigrating salmon population if they are listed as an endangered species. The appearance of young delta smelt at the export facilities has been a regular occurrence at some point in the April-June period, and the discretionary 15 days are intended to address those years when delta smelt entrainment is a problem at a time outside of the expanded VAMP window.

Implementation of the full AFRP is required under federal policy, but a commitment was expressed to use JPOD and other water supply tools to try to reduce impacts on federal contractors. Many of the AFRP actions directly address potential problems identified by DEFT.

#### *Possible Modifications:*

- o *Change number of VAMP days and/or change number of discretionary days at this season. Such changes would affect the need to find other sources for the EWA to address pumping effects at other times.*

- o Modify, rather than eliminate, E/I Ratio as an operational control. This would reduce volume of water immediately available to EWA, but increase somewhat the level of entrainment effects throughout the period.*
- o Tighten default rules. Reduce access to environmental credits.*
- o Move AFRP in-delta actions to list of priority actions for implementation through EWA, rather than as part of default operational criteria. Increase volume of EWA water available but broaden list of environmental needs.*

**Snapshot of possible EWA assets on day 1 -- Assumed to be August 21, 1999 (San Luis low point)**

1. 100 kaf of non spillable water stored south of the delta on behalf of EWA. This water would need to be deposited during 1999. There is currently an abundance of water throughout the system but a shortage of storage sites. A storage site could be arranged as part of the stage 1 implementation package through negotiations of agreements, leases, or purchases.
2. Contract with USBR and SWP for 100% share of supplies generated by elimination of E/I. Language in the 1995 WQCP permits flexing of E/I ratios to improve protection of fisheries as long as change in total exports is zero within six months. A change in this language to increase the averaging period would add considerable flexibility.
3. Contract with USBR for 50% share of supplies generated by JPOD. Negotiations are underway to allow a joint point of diversion with different constraints than at present, which greatly restricts any use of JPOD to increase delta exports. Language about use of JPOD could return water released from federal reservoirs to meet the upstream AFRP actions to federal contractors south of the delta. Such use of JPOD could greatly reduce the impact of in-delta AFRP actions.

Contract quantities would reflect the improvements to yield of these actions (probably on the order of 180 kaf., based on available modeling). The contract amount would reflect the amount of water protected by the E/I standard, which forms a greater proportion of developed water in lower flow conditions. It would defeat the intent of the E/I requirement if implementation resulted in less water for EWA in drier years. Therefore, if a portion of the EWA is viewed as implementation of the E/I standard, then a higher priority or minimum contract amount (similar to the Friant exchange contractors) is probably necessary.

As with other State and federal contractors, the actual quantity delivered in any year would be based upon reservoir storage and hydrology. This contracted water would not rely upon access to storage, if used in the same year, but come from the improved State and federal project supplies. Point of delivery might nominally be San Luis Reservoir with a date of delivery of August 30. Point and date of delivery could be transferred as with other export contract. If EWA contract amounts are not transferred to another party, then storage would be needed to accumulate water for use in future years.

As with other contracts, south-of-delta transfers could allow this water to be used in

advance of the actual date of delivery. EWA deliveries would not rely upon access to storage, if used in the same year, but come from State and federal project supplies.

4. 200 kaf worth of option contracts for water south of the Delta, with enough money in reserve to call in those options for 4 years during Stage 1 of CALFED implementation.

*Possible Modifications:*

- o Instead of contracts for a share of new supplies from elimination of E/I and JPOD, water in the EWA could be accounted within a strict daily accounting as discussed at the November 24 meeting.*
- o Contracts could be based on dry period or average improvements to supply, they could be based on a minimum amount to be delivered in all years, or an amount that varies with other contract deliveries, or a combination of the above where dry period deliveries are used to define a minimum and average improvements are used for actions that do not relate to present standards.*
- o More or less water through options could be developed.*
- o More or less water could be stored during 1999 in advance of the start date.*
- o The sharing formulas could be altered.*

**Further development of EWA during Stage 1**

1. EWA controls 50% of new storage south of the Delta during Stage 1. Assume 300 kaf of environmental high priority storage above and beyond the 100 kaf of storage on day 1. Fillable with any water developed or purchased by EWA. Storage availability has a strong relationship to the amount of water available through flexible implementation of the E/I requirement and JPOD.
2. Contract with USBR and SWP for 50% share of supplies generated by (1) expansion of Banks pumping and (2) State/Federal canal intertie. When combined with the tools in stage 1 this generates on the order of 600 kaf. Carryover of EWA water to later years would require some form of storage that would not interfere with deliveries and operations for other contractors.
3. EWA cofunds reclamation project in southern California and gains credits for its share of water produced each year. Assume 20 kaf of reliable water each year.
4. Expansion of option contracts by 200 kaf.
5. Additional EWA water may be generated by curtailing the VAMP period or by not using all 15 discretionary days of shut down (see description of default rules).

Thus, after Stage 1, the EWA would have the following assets:

**[fill in]**

*Possible modifications:*

- o Different sharing formulas*
- o Credits based upon daily accounting instead of treating credits as annual contracts.*
- o More or less reclamation. More or less option contracts.*

**Water Supply Impacts**

The water supply impacts of the "day 1" and "end of stage 1" scenarios are as follows:

[List with both baselines]

**Relationship to upstream water**

1. There will be upstream environmental accounts. Changes in Delta operations may have upstream storage and yield implications. All operations will be based upon the "no harm" principle. If EWA operations in the Delta cost water upstream (something that may not be known until the next winter), the EWA is responsible for finding compensation water. Similarly, if EWA operations in the Delta increase net supplies, the EWA will control this water.
2. The EWA and the ERP water purchase program will be integrated. Upstream EWA water may be used to satisfy instream flow targets and may be exported (at the discretion of the eco managers) to generate water in export areas. ERP purchases may be used to pay off upstream EWA debts to the water users.

**Fungibility of EWA Credits**

Except for the linkage between the EWA and the ERP water purchase program, water and money dedicated for the EWA cannot be reallocated to other ERP programs without the consent of all agencies with ESA responsibilities -- USFWS, NMFS, DFG. However, EWA water may be sold in order to help fund other EWA assets, such as storage facilities or water option contracts.

**Operating/ Accounting Procedures**

1. The fundamental principle is "no harm". The EWA is responsible for supplying makeup water to the projects or for compensating those impacted by EWA operations. EWA operations that do not harm the water users do not require compensation (e.g., if San Luis fills despite EWA operations, then no compensation is required.).
2. The EWA would operate on a fiscal year that runs from one low point in San Luis to another. Nominal delivery of EWA water to San Luis on Aug 30 of each year would permit clearer accounting and payback.
3. EWA may call for export reductions based upon the expected delivery of water to its

account at any given time. Transferable quantities include:

1. Expected contract allocations from the state and federal projects; plus
  2. EWA water in surface storage; plus
  3. EWA groundwater storage that can be extracted in time to compensate water users within the EWA fiscal year; plus
  4. Water generated by efficiency or reclamation projects within the current year; plus
  5. The amount of callable water option contracts within the current year; minus
  6. The amount of credits already expended in the current year.
4. If EWA calls for export reductions between the end of the "fiscal" year and the high point in San Luis, then the amount of export reductions that must be made up is the lesser of (1) the unfilled portion of San Luis and (2) the amount of export reductions required. Thus, if San Luis fills, EWA debts to the projects are erased.
5. The EWA may make arrangements to carry over debt across "fiscal" years, using voluntary arrangements. For example, if San Luis has significant carryover storage and no users will be harmed by a delayed payback, then the debt may be carried into the next winter. If San Luis fills, then the debt will be erased. Similarly, the EWA may use its assets as collateral for multiyear loans (e.g., it may use groundwater storage as collateral for a long term loan of water from MWD).

#### **Environmental priorities for state and federal conveyance facilities**

Priorities, in descending order:

1. Firm contract deliveries -- including contract deliveries for the EWA.
2. EWA water generated by increased operational flexibility.
3. Non firm deliveries to contractors
4. Reserved space for market transfers, including EWA transfers
5. EWA operations -- e.g., shifting water from one storage site to another.

Considerations: If part of the EWA comes from the implementation of an existing legal standard (i.e. the Export/Inflow ratio) the priority of that portion should probably reflect the same priority as meeting any other standard.

#### **Biological Aiming Points**

Two efforts have been made to estimate the biological needs to protect fishes of the estuary from the effects of entrainment or to provide sufficient ecosystem level improvements to compensate for export impacts. These efforts are represented by the 'prescriptive' scenario A developed by USFWS and NMFS and the 'mortality reduction' scenario E developed by other parties in DEFT. When the incremental costs of in-delta AFRP actions are considered, both of these scenarios give impacts on delta exports in the range of 300 kaf. Supply benefits of implementing E/I as an EWA are approximately 180 kaf. Releasing the Corps' 4-Pumps Criteria, unlimited JPOD and a state/federal intertie generates an improvement supply of about 238 kaf, on average. Not all

desirable modeling runs have ben done but the costs of proposed protective measures seem to be roughly similar and less than the average volume of water that might be available to the EWA in stage one. Appendix A is a rough approximation of how an EWA might have operated in a relpay of the years 1987-1994. Seven of these eight years were critically dry, but water could be generated in all but three of them to meet the positive QWEST criterion in January, without taking any extra exports in May or June (when the proposed expansion of VAMP conditions would prohibit such actions). This simulation should be repeated with a run wherein the two month VAMP is included as a starting condition, but those results were unavailable. From this simulated drought, a total of 500 kaf is suggested as a necessary volume of options or alternative supplies.

### **Decisionmaking authority**

Near term authority for decisionmaking of EWA resides in USFWS, NMFS, DFG. Operational decisions generally worked out in Ops Group. Where time is essential, a subgroup may make decisions.

Day 1 assets (non spill storage, options) secured by SWP and USBR in consultation with USFWS, NMFS, DFG.

Longer term institutional arrangements still to be negotiated.

### **Regulatory Certainty**

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### **Who Pays**

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**APPENDIX: A DROUGHT EXAMPLE OPERATION**

EWA = SUM OF ADDED EXPORTS UNLESS SLR IS FILLED

NO ADDED EXPORTS IN APRIL AND MAY,

JAN QWEST HELD TO 0, ANY ADDED EXPORTS IN JAN REDUCE QWEST

	ADDEDSL EXPORT FILLED? S	QWEST	EWA
1987	33	-382	33
NOV	5	-239	38
DEC	58 YES	-353	0
JAN	-35 YES	-27	0
FEB	3 YES	23	0
MAR	3 YES	29	0
APR	261	-182	0
MAY	29	-2	0
JUNE	439	-392	439
JULY	94	-155	533
AUG	-291	-96	242
SEP	-194	0	48
1988	4	-190	52
NOV	0	-52	52
DEC	130	-527	182
JAN	195	-451	-256
FEB	-61	11	-317
MAR	12	-46	-305
APR	180	-134	-305
MAY	27	-22	-305
JUNE	-92	-4	-397
JULY	-155	-3	-552
AUG	-37	101	-589
SEP	1	0	-588
1989	-68	-24	-656
NOV	0	-169	-656
DEC	0	-201	-656
JAN	34	-396	-362
FEB	0	82	-362
MAR	203	-321	-159
APR	139	-152	-159
MAY	47	-30	-159
JUNE	553	-469	394
JULY	65	-148	459
AUG	-271	-10	188
SEP	41	-206	229
1990	-30	-351	199
NOV	-7	-266	192

DEC	10	-284	202
JAN	167	-537	-370
FEB	-100 YES	-55	0
MAR	49 YES	-176	0
APR	146	-133	0
MAY	26	13	0
JUNE	-157	14	-157
JULY	-251	44	-408
AUG	0	100	-408
SEP	-73	-30	-481
1991	3	-129	-478
NOV	-16	-96	-494
DEC	-41	-102	-535
JAN	-40	-39	-79
FEB	2	112	-77
MAR	193	-352	116
APR	105	-81	116
MAY	29	-10	116
JUNE	-107	151	9
JULY	-55	93	-46
AUG	17	30	-29
SEP	-4	-7	-33
1992	44	-53	11
NOV	45	-120	56
DEC	37	-136	93
JAN	23	-318	-295
FEB	65 YES	-49	0
MAR	163 YES	-267	0
APR	144	-78	0
MAY	24	-36	0
JUNE	-141	31	-141
JULY	-33	47	-174
AUG	0	70	-174
SEP	0	0	-174
1993	19	-2	-155
NOV	10	-82	-145
DEC	147	-412	2
JAN	109	394	111
FEB	110	121	221
MAR	59	97	280
APR	102	156	280
MAY	89	261	280
JUNE	215	-387	495
JULY	-167	-38	328
AUG	98	-137	426
SEP	40	-251	466

	1994			
		227	-499	693
NOV		123	-435	816
DEC		202	-510	1018
JAN		-160	-23	-183
FEB		-158	108	-341
MAR		-17	-142	-358
APR		257	-212	-358
MAY		26	9	-358
JUNE		439	-394	81
JULY		112	-191	193
AUG		-296	-118	-103
SEP		-54	-127	-157